Andersen Air Force Base's Location Gives U.S. Air Force A Strategic Advantage In The Pacific
Written by Senior Airman John Schondelmeyer
36th Wing Public Affairs, Andersen AFB
Sunday, August 17, 2008 10:18 AM
ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, Guam - B-52 Stratofortressess and other Air Force fighters, tankers and air control aircraft occupy the flightline at Andersen here July 29. The aircraft, deployed from several Air Force bases, are here to promote regional security and stability through three main focus areas: a continuous forward presence; a robust international exercise and training program; and significant joint military training exercises. By maintaining a continuous forward presence and conducting joint exercises, the Pacific Air Force is able to foster improved relations and interoperability with its regional friends and allies.(U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1St Class Cory Todd)
ANDERSEN AFB, Guam - Andersen is a strategically located, forward main operating base in the Pacific. The constant rotation of Andersen has an impressive roster of aircraft that are housed here throughout any given cycle. In 2008 alone, Andersen has been a temporary home to airborne warning and control system, B-2s, B-52s, F-15s, F-22s, cargo, tankers, and a variety of naval aircraft. The base is postured to support operations across the spectrum of conflicts and provides extraordinary flexibilities for the Pacific command.
Showing posts with label Strategic Flexibility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Strategic Flexibility. Show all posts
Sunday, August 17, 2008
Saturday, June 09, 2007
Message from the DOI on the Military Buildup in the Marianas
The Saipan Tribune
Sunday, June 10, 2007
'Coordination vital for Guam military buildup'
Ginnen I Department of Interior
HAGÅTÑA, Guam-The opportunities and challenges posed by the redeployment of 8,000 U.S. Marines and 9,000 military dependents to this island as part of a force realignment in the Asian-Pacific region was the primary focus of discussion during Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne's official visit here.
Kempthorne held talks with Guam Gov. Felix Camacho, Lt. Gov. Michael Cruz, members of the Guam Legislature, Navy and Air Force representatives and the Guam Civilian-Military Task Force during two days of meetings in this strategically important U.S. territory in the Western Pacific.
“I cannot overstate how important it is for the Department of the Interior to work in close coordination with the Department of Defense and the Government of Guam to ensure that this transfer is accomplished as seamlessly as possible,” Kempthorne said. “While Guam will derive great economic benefits from the military build up, the government will need assistance in preparing the territory's infrastructure for the influx of so many thousands of people over a relatively short time. The Interior Department stands ready to help.”
Kempthorne, whose department has overall responsibility for federal policy in the U.S. island territories, was accompanied by BJ Penn, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment; Donald Schregardus, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for Environment; and David Cohen, Interior's deputy assistant secretary for Insular Affairs.
In addition to the redeployment of U.S. Marines and their dependents from Okinawa, the Defense Department will be moving other Navy, Air Force and Army units to Guam over the next seven years as part of a major regional realignment. The moves could add an additional 30,000 people to the island's population of about 170,000.
The buildup will infuse an estimated $10.5 billion for new construction, rehabilitation and relocation projects in the territory over the next seven years. The work includes housing, naval and air base facility expansion, road and utility work. The Japanese government is contributing about $6 billion of the total cost and the U.S. government about $4 billion. The government of Guam is planning to improve seaport and utility services and significantly expand its labor force to accommodate the build up.
In addition to meeting government and private sector leaders, Kempthorne was briefed at the principal military bases. On Thursday, he visited the naval base for discussions with Capt. Janice Wynn, Chief of Staff, Commander, Naval Forces Marianas. On Friday, he visited Anderson Air Force Base for talks with Brig. Gen. Doug Owens, wing commander. Both bases will play key roles in the Marine redeployment. During both visits, Kempthorne thanked military personnel for their service.
Kempthorne, Penn and Camacho placed a wreath at War in the Pacific National Historic Park, which honors the thousands of Americans and local Chamorros who died during the World War II occupation and liberation of Guam, as well as the citizens of Guam who suffered during the occupation. Kempthorne also attended the interment of Iosiwo Uruo, a U.S. Army soldier from Guam who was recently killed in action while serving in Iraq.
The Cabinet official visited Ritidian Point National Wildlife Refuge for a first-hand look at efforts by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Geological Survey to eradicate the invasive brown tree snake. Native to Southeast Asia, the species has devastated the native bird populations of Guam, and could spread to other sensitive ecosystems in the Pacific. Both agencies are overseen by the Department of the Interior.
Guam was the second stop of Kempthorne's visit to U.S.-affiliated Pacific communities. He earlier visited the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and will next visit the freely associated states of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, concluding his official visits in American Samoa.
On Monday, June 11, 2007, Kempthorne will meet with leaders of the Federated States of Micronesia and Pohnpei State during his official visit to the FSM capitol.
Kempthorne will confer with FSM President Emmanuel Mori and Vice President Alik L. Alik, FSM Congress Speaker Isaac Figir and meet with Pohnpei State Gov. Johnny P. David. He will also meet with U.S. Ambassador Suzanne Hale as well as veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces from Pohnpei and visit Nan Madol, the site of ancient megalithic structures.
As Secretary of the Interior, Kempthorne is responsible for overall coordination of federal policy for the U.S. insular areas, advocating for the islands within the federal government, overseeing the distribution of appropriated funds for island territories, and administering U.S. financial assistance for the freely associated states.
Guam, a U.S. territory since 1898, is the largest (212 square miles) and southern most island of the Marianas Archipelago as well as the largest island in the Western Pacific, and serves as the telecommunications and air/sea transportation hub of the region.
Located 1,500 miles east of Manila and 1,500 miles south-southeast of Tokyo, Guam provides flexibility of movement for forward-deployed U.S. forces in the region. About 3,700 miles west-southwest of Honolulu, Guam's Apra Harbor is the largest deepwater port between Hawaii and Manila.
Sunday, June 10, 2007
'Coordination vital for Guam military buildup'
Ginnen I Department of Interior
HAGÅTÑA, Guam-The opportunities and challenges posed by the redeployment of 8,000 U.S. Marines and 9,000 military dependents to this island as part of a force realignment in the Asian-Pacific region was the primary focus of discussion during Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne's official visit here.
Kempthorne held talks with Guam Gov. Felix Camacho, Lt. Gov. Michael Cruz, members of the Guam Legislature, Navy and Air Force representatives and the Guam Civilian-Military Task Force during two days of meetings in this strategically important U.S. territory in the Western Pacific.
“I cannot overstate how important it is for the Department of the Interior to work in close coordination with the Department of Defense and the Government of Guam to ensure that this transfer is accomplished as seamlessly as possible,” Kempthorne said. “While Guam will derive great economic benefits from the military build up, the government will need assistance in preparing the territory's infrastructure for the influx of so many thousands of people over a relatively short time. The Interior Department stands ready to help.”
Kempthorne, whose department has overall responsibility for federal policy in the U.S. island territories, was accompanied by BJ Penn, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment; Donald Schregardus, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for Environment; and David Cohen, Interior's deputy assistant secretary for Insular Affairs.
In addition to the redeployment of U.S. Marines and their dependents from Okinawa, the Defense Department will be moving other Navy, Air Force and Army units to Guam over the next seven years as part of a major regional realignment. The moves could add an additional 30,000 people to the island's population of about 170,000.
The buildup will infuse an estimated $10.5 billion for new construction, rehabilitation and relocation projects in the territory over the next seven years. The work includes housing, naval and air base facility expansion, road and utility work. The Japanese government is contributing about $6 billion of the total cost and the U.S. government about $4 billion. The government of Guam is planning to improve seaport and utility services and significantly expand its labor force to accommodate the build up.
In addition to meeting government and private sector leaders, Kempthorne was briefed at the principal military bases. On Thursday, he visited the naval base for discussions with Capt. Janice Wynn, Chief of Staff, Commander, Naval Forces Marianas. On Friday, he visited Anderson Air Force Base for talks with Brig. Gen. Doug Owens, wing commander. Both bases will play key roles in the Marine redeployment. During both visits, Kempthorne thanked military personnel for their service.
Kempthorne, Penn and Camacho placed a wreath at War in the Pacific National Historic Park, which honors the thousands of Americans and local Chamorros who died during the World War II occupation and liberation of Guam, as well as the citizens of Guam who suffered during the occupation. Kempthorne also attended the interment of Iosiwo Uruo, a U.S. Army soldier from Guam who was recently killed in action while serving in Iraq.
The Cabinet official visited Ritidian Point National Wildlife Refuge for a first-hand look at efforts by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Geological Survey to eradicate the invasive brown tree snake. Native to Southeast Asia, the species has devastated the native bird populations of Guam, and could spread to other sensitive ecosystems in the Pacific. Both agencies are overseen by the Department of the Interior.
Guam was the second stop of Kempthorne's visit to U.S.-affiliated Pacific communities. He earlier visited the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and will next visit the freely associated states of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, concluding his official visits in American Samoa.
On Monday, June 11, 2007, Kempthorne will meet with leaders of the Federated States of Micronesia and Pohnpei State during his official visit to the FSM capitol.
Kempthorne will confer with FSM President Emmanuel Mori and Vice President Alik L. Alik, FSM Congress Speaker Isaac Figir and meet with Pohnpei State Gov. Johnny P. David. He will also meet with U.S. Ambassador Suzanne Hale as well as veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces from Pohnpei and visit Nan Madol, the site of ancient megalithic structures.
As Secretary of the Interior, Kempthorne is responsible for overall coordination of federal policy for the U.S. insular areas, advocating for the islands within the federal government, overseeing the distribution of appropriated funds for island territories, and administering U.S. financial assistance for the freely associated states.
Guam, a U.S. territory since 1898, is the largest (212 square miles) and southern most island of the Marianas Archipelago as well as the largest island in the Western Pacific, and serves as the telecommunications and air/sea transportation hub of the region.
Located 1,500 miles east of Manila and 1,500 miles south-southeast of Tokyo, Guam provides flexibility of movement for forward-deployed U.S. forces in the region. About 3,700 miles west-southwest of Honolulu, Guam's Apra Harbor is the largest deepwater port between Hawaii and Manila.
Thursday, May 03, 2007
Fortress Hubs
David Axe
U.S. is building up forces on strategic islands in the Far East
Aviation Week
April 27, 2007
U.S. Air Force KC-135R Stratotanker angles toward Kadena Air Base from the sea, its four turbofans idling as it flares for landing. A Navy P-3C Orion patrol plane is visible through the bluish smoke as the tanker's tires touch the runway. The P-3C accelerates to its place in a long line of aircraft waiting to take off, including F-15C Eagle fighters and, for the first time outside the U.S., brand-new F-22A Raptor stealth fighters on a three-month deployment from Langley, Va. One by one the fighters roar into the bright blue sky over this Japanese island, heading for an ocean range where they will practice aerial combat and tanking, preparing for the day when they might be ordered to sweep the skies of Chinese or North Korean warplanes as part of the defense of Taiwan or a bombing campaign against Kim Jong Il's nuclear facilities.
Thousands of miles from Okinawa, U.S. ground forces are fighting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts that have effectively monopolized the nation's deployable land power. But in the Pacific, the Pentagon's focus is on the opposite end of the spectrum of potential conflict: The perceived threats here are large industrial militaries equipped with ships, aircraft and tanks, whose commanders develop strategies for traditional goals like capturing territory. The 300,000-strong U.S. forces arrayed to defeat these threats are, in contrast to those fighting in the war on terror, primarily air and naval.
Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan increasingly promote soft strategies such as reconstruction, humanitarian aid and foreign security-force reform in order to win a conflict with relatively little direct combat. In the Pacific, by contrast, improving U.S. forces means spending big dollars to outfit them with the latest hardware while also expanding the sprawling bases that will serve as "fortress hubs" for future operations in the region. In coming years, Pacific Command is gaining three permanent F-22 squadrons, 16 C-17 Globemaster airlifters, two additional nuclear attack submarines and the first Littoral Combat Ships, in addition to its present forces.
"Arms buildup? I wouldn't use that language," says Air Force Maj. David Griesmer from Pacific Command, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. "There's certainly an acknowledgment that Pacom is half the world. These capabilities need to either go on one side [of the world] or the other. The Asia-Pacific region is growing. It's the way of the future. There's a large amount of economic activity." Plus, he adds, "The six largest militaries are in this area," a reference to China, the U.S., Russia, India, North Korea and South Korea.
To many observers, in fact, the future looks a lot like the past--the Cold War, but with an Asian flair.
Indeed, the linchpin bases for U.S. Pacific strategy are both prizes from World War II to which the Cold War was a grand corollary. Okinawa, Japan's southernmost prefecture and the site of Kadena AB among other U.S. installations, was wrested from Japan during a three-month struggle in 1945, during which at least 200,000 people died. Guam, the other major U.S. hub in the Pacific, was invaded and occupied by Japan between 1941 and 1944. More than 20,000 people died when the U.S. retook the island.
The locations and geographies of the outposts dictate their roles. Despite being crowded and something of a political hot potato, Okinawa's proximity to the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula--just over an hour's flight to either--and the sheer size of Kadena, one of the largest U.S. air bases in the world, means it is indispensable as a base for short-range aircraft that must react quickly.
At Kadena, alongside 7,000 personnel, the USAF has permanently stationed more than 50 F-15s plus tankers, E-3 Sentry radar planes, HH-60G rescue choppers and Special Forces aircraft, all belonging to the 18th Wing. Elsewhere on Okinawa, the Marines fly F/A-18 Hornet fighters, tankers and helicopters. RC-135 Rivet Joint spy planes and EA-6B Prowler jammers are frequent guests. The Navy's six Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers, including the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, are also regular visitors to the area with their Hornets, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, E-2C Hawkeye radar planes and helicopters. And in a crisis, perhaps hundreds of U.S.-based fighter aircraft would converge on Okinawa.
"Because of our capability to stage forces out of here--this is a huge runway--we do believe we have unmatched air power," says Kadena official John Monroe. "That's probably the most important thing about Kadena."
During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, then Pacom chief, Navy Adm. William Fallon, and Army Gen. Burwell Bell, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, seconded Monroe's assessment, announcing that U.S. Pacific forces maintain "overmatch" in the region, especially with regard to aircraft and ships. But Bell conceded that bomb and missile stockpiles were a potentially limiting factor.
That's a view the Air Force shares. Hence its investment in a 6,000-acre munitions storage area adjacent to the Kadena runway, the size of which exceeds that of many air bases elsewhere in the world. "We keep munitions for several types of aircraft because we are going to be a forward staging base," Monroe explains.
The F-22 deployment to Kadena, which began in February, is exercising the base's ability to support visiting fighter units in addition to testing the expeditionary skills of F-22 pilots and maintainers from the 27th Fighter Sqdn., which is part of the 1st Fighter Wing. And the deployment is paving the way for permanent basing of three Raptor squadrons in the region, starting with 18 jets for the Alaska-based 3rd Wing this year.
Many regions might have hosted the new fighter's first foreign deployment. But the Pacific is a perfect fit for the Raptor "because it can travel long distances," Griesmer says. The Raptor's range, while classified, exceeds that of most other fighters.
But 27th Fighter Sqdn. commander Lt. Col. Wade Tolliver says that, more than range, the Raptor's ability to penetrate air defenses--thanks to its speed, stealth and sensors--makes it uniquely qualified for Pacific duty as a trailblazer for all those follow-on forces Monroe describes. "There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defense systems," Tolliver says. "The United States and its allies are used to going to a place and building up things prior to making an offensive. . . . What we need to do is take some of our assets that have special capabilities--B-2s, F-22s, F-117s--and roll back those integrated air-defense systems so we can bring in our joint forces."
From a training perspective, the Pacific is ideal for fighter pilots due to the high concentration of friendly jets for mock dogfighting, and because of the large number of tankers at Kadena and other bases. "Tanker capability is very important," Griesmer says of the Pacific. "Look at the map and see all the blue." But due to tanker shortages in the U.S. owing to the fleet's advanced age, the fighter pilots that might have to rely on aerial refueling during a Pacific surge find it difficult to keep up that perishable skill. "Normally, we tank about once a week because we're sharing tanking assets with other fighters on the East Coast," says Capt. Chris Gentile from the 27th Fighter Sqdn. But at Kadena, he and the other Raptor jockeys tank almost every day.
Distance, and its perils, define Pacific operations. Kadena's proximity to potential battlefields is an advantage for short-range fighters, but a liability too, since it's within range of North Korea's and China's tactical ballistic missiles. The U.S. Navy has deployed rudimentary sea-based missile defenses in the Sea of Japan in the form of Raytheon SM-3 Standard interceptors on board a handful of the 175 ships in the Pacific Fleet. As a backstop, in August the Army stationed a Lockheed Martin PAC-3 anti-missile battery at Kadena to protect the air base.
Guam, more than 1,000 mi. to the south, is protected from ballistic missiles by its distance, allowing the Army to postpone a planned PAC-3 deployment to the island to around 2012. What's more, while local political opposition has long plagued U.S. forces in Japan, the Chamorros of Guam mostly welcome the 12,000 military personnel on the island. "It may be easier for us to be there, as far as the diplomatic issue is concerned," Monroe says "but if we're in Guam, we're out of the fight" due to the distance.
This distance has shaped the force structure on Guam. For three years, the island's Andersen Air Base has hosted rotations of heavy bombers, tankers and patrol planes from the U.S., all assets with long ranges and long loiter times that mitigate the impact of distance on their operations. In February, the USAF activated the 36th Operations Group on the island to smooth the comings and goings of B-52H Stratofortresses, B-1B Lancers and B-2A Spirits. And this year, the Air Force will permanently station RQ-4B Global Hawk spy drones at Andersen. To support these aircraft plus the three attack submarines that began arriving in 2002, two more submarines that are planned and as many as 8,000 Marines from Okinawa, the Pentagon is investing up to $1 billion in construction over the next decade.
Okinawa and Guam thus fulfill complementary roles in U.S. Pacific strategy-the former as a staging base for short-range fighters, the latter as a safer, albeit more distant, base for bombers, drones and submarines.
U.S. is building up forces on strategic islands in the Far East
Aviation Week
April 27, 2007
U.S. Air Force KC-135R Stratotanker angles toward Kadena Air Base from the sea, its four turbofans idling as it flares for landing. A Navy P-3C Orion patrol plane is visible through the bluish smoke as the tanker's tires touch the runway. The P-3C accelerates to its place in a long line of aircraft waiting to take off, including F-15C Eagle fighters and, for the first time outside the U.S., brand-new F-22A Raptor stealth fighters on a three-month deployment from Langley, Va. One by one the fighters roar into the bright blue sky over this Japanese island, heading for an ocean range where they will practice aerial combat and tanking, preparing for the day when they might be ordered to sweep the skies of Chinese or North Korean warplanes as part of the defense of Taiwan or a bombing campaign against Kim Jong Il's nuclear facilities.
Thousands of miles from Okinawa, U.S. ground forces are fighting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts that have effectively monopolized the nation's deployable land power. But in the Pacific, the Pentagon's focus is on the opposite end of the spectrum of potential conflict: The perceived threats here are large industrial militaries equipped with ships, aircraft and tanks, whose commanders develop strategies for traditional goals like capturing territory. The 300,000-strong U.S. forces arrayed to defeat these threats are, in contrast to those fighting in the war on terror, primarily air and naval.
Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan increasingly promote soft strategies such as reconstruction, humanitarian aid and foreign security-force reform in order to win a conflict with relatively little direct combat. In the Pacific, by contrast, improving U.S. forces means spending big dollars to outfit them with the latest hardware while also expanding the sprawling bases that will serve as "fortress hubs" for future operations in the region. In coming years, Pacific Command is gaining three permanent F-22 squadrons, 16 C-17 Globemaster airlifters, two additional nuclear attack submarines and the first Littoral Combat Ships, in addition to its present forces.
"Arms buildup? I wouldn't use that language," says Air Force Maj. David Griesmer from Pacific Command, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. "There's certainly an acknowledgment that Pacom is half the world. These capabilities need to either go on one side [of the world] or the other. The Asia-Pacific region is growing. It's the way of the future. There's a large amount of economic activity." Plus, he adds, "The six largest militaries are in this area," a reference to China, the U.S., Russia, India, North Korea and South Korea.
To many observers, in fact, the future looks a lot like the past--the Cold War, but with an Asian flair.
Indeed, the linchpin bases for U.S. Pacific strategy are both prizes from World War II to which the Cold War was a grand corollary. Okinawa, Japan's southernmost prefecture and the site of Kadena AB among other U.S. installations, was wrested from Japan during a three-month struggle in 1945, during which at least 200,000 people died. Guam, the other major U.S. hub in the Pacific, was invaded and occupied by Japan between 1941 and 1944. More than 20,000 people died when the U.S. retook the island.
The locations and geographies of the outposts dictate their roles. Despite being crowded and something of a political hot potato, Okinawa's proximity to the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula--just over an hour's flight to either--and the sheer size of Kadena, one of the largest U.S. air bases in the world, means it is indispensable as a base for short-range aircraft that must react quickly.
At Kadena, alongside 7,000 personnel, the USAF has permanently stationed more than 50 F-15s plus tankers, E-3 Sentry radar planes, HH-60G rescue choppers and Special Forces aircraft, all belonging to the 18th Wing. Elsewhere on Okinawa, the Marines fly F/A-18 Hornet fighters, tankers and helicopters. RC-135 Rivet Joint spy planes and EA-6B Prowler jammers are frequent guests. The Navy's six Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers, including the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, are also regular visitors to the area with their Hornets, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, E-2C Hawkeye radar planes and helicopters. And in a crisis, perhaps hundreds of U.S.-based fighter aircraft would converge on Okinawa.
"Because of our capability to stage forces out of here--this is a huge runway--we do believe we have unmatched air power," says Kadena official John Monroe. "That's probably the most important thing about Kadena."
During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, then Pacom chief, Navy Adm. William Fallon, and Army Gen. Burwell Bell, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, seconded Monroe's assessment, announcing that U.S. Pacific forces maintain "overmatch" in the region, especially with regard to aircraft and ships. But Bell conceded that bomb and missile stockpiles were a potentially limiting factor.
That's a view the Air Force shares. Hence its investment in a 6,000-acre munitions storage area adjacent to the Kadena runway, the size of which exceeds that of many air bases elsewhere in the world. "We keep munitions for several types of aircraft because we are going to be a forward staging base," Monroe explains.
The F-22 deployment to Kadena, which began in February, is exercising the base's ability to support visiting fighter units in addition to testing the expeditionary skills of F-22 pilots and maintainers from the 27th Fighter Sqdn., which is part of the 1st Fighter Wing. And the deployment is paving the way for permanent basing of three Raptor squadrons in the region, starting with 18 jets for the Alaska-based 3rd Wing this year.
Many regions might have hosted the new fighter's first foreign deployment. But the Pacific is a perfect fit for the Raptor "because it can travel long distances," Griesmer says. The Raptor's range, while classified, exceeds that of most other fighters.
But 27th Fighter Sqdn. commander Lt. Col. Wade Tolliver says that, more than range, the Raptor's ability to penetrate air defenses--thanks to its speed, stealth and sensors--makes it uniquely qualified for Pacific duty as a trailblazer for all those follow-on forces Monroe describes. "There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defense systems," Tolliver says. "The United States and its allies are used to going to a place and building up things prior to making an offensive. . . . What we need to do is take some of our assets that have special capabilities--B-2s, F-22s, F-117s--and roll back those integrated air-defense systems so we can bring in our joint forces."
From a training perspective, the Pacific is ideal for fighter pilots due to the high concentration of friendly jets for mock dogfighting, and because of the large number of tankers at Kadena and other bases. "Tanker capability is very important," Griesmer says of the Pacific. "Look at the map and see all the blue." But due to tanker shortages in the U.S. owing to the fleet's advanced age, the fighter pilots that might have to rely on aerial refueling during a Pacific surge find it difficult to keep up that perishable skill. "Normally, we tank about once a week because we're sharing tanking assets with other fighters on the East Coast," says Capt. Chris Gentile from the 27th Fighter Sqdn. But at Kadena, he and the other Raptor jockeys tank almost every day.
Distance, and its perils, define Pacific operations. Kadena's proximity to potential battlefields is an advantage for short-range fighters, but a liability too, since it's within range of North Korea's and China's tactical ballistic missiles. The U.S. Navy has deployed rudimentary sea-based missile defenses in the Sea of Japan in the form of Raytheon SM-3 Standard interceptors on board a handful of the 175 ships in the Pacific Fleet. As a backstop, in August the Army stationed a Lockheed Martin PAC-3 anti-missile battery at Kadena to protect the air base.
Guam, more than 1,000 mi. to the south, is protected from ballistic missiles by its distance, allowing the Army to postpone a planned PAC-3 deployment to the island to around 2012. What's more, while local political opposition has long plagued U.S. forces in Japan, the Chamorros of Guam mostly welcome the 12,000 military personnel on the island. "It may be easier for us to be there, as far as the diplomatic issue is concerned," Monroe says "but if we're in Guam, we're out of the fight" due to the distance.
This distance has shaped the force structure on Guam. For three years, the island's Andersen Air Base has hosted rotations of heavy bombers, tankers and patrol planes from the U.S., all assets with long ranges and long loiter times that mitigate the impact of distance on their operations. In February, the USAF activated the 36th Operations Group on the island to smooth the comings and goings of B-52H Stratofortresses, B-1B Lancers and B-2A Spirits. And this year, the Air Force will permanently station RQ-4B Global Hawk spy drones at Andersen. To support these aircraft plus the three attack submarines that began arriving in 2002, two more submarines that are planned and as many as 8,000 Marines from Okinawa, the Pentagon is investing up to $1 billion in construction over the next decade.
Okinawa and Guam thus fulfill complementary roles in U.S. Pacific strategy-the former as a staging base for short-range fighters, the latter as a safer, albeit more distant, base for bombers, drones and submarines.
Friday, March 09, 2007
Basing panel recommends against moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam
By Leo Shane III, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Wednesday, May 11, 2005
WASHINGTON — The future of the Pacific fighting force hinges on keeping Marines in Okinawa and abandoning proposals to move them to Guam, say members of the Overseas Basing Commission.
“Okinawa is the strategic linchpin in the Pacific region,” Commissioner James Thomson, CEO of the Rand Corp., said at a news conference Monday unveiling the group’s report on the future of overseas military facilities.
The report had leaked out on Friday, much of it reported in Sunday editions of Stars and Stripes.
“This is a matter ultimately of distance, how close one can be to the area of potential threat, either ones we already know about or ones that can emerge. The location of Okinawa from the point of covering those threats is much better than Guam. It’s closer.”
The commission has recommended that the Defense Department slow down the return of foreign-based troops to the United States, and specifically that most Marines currently on Okinawa remain there.
The report does recommend that the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station be relocated, either to Kadena Air Base or Marines Corps Air Station Iwakuni.
For the past two years, defense officials have discussed the possibility of relocating Marines off Okinawa, with rumors including moves to Guam, the Philippines or Hawaii.
Commissioner Anthony Less, a retired vice admiral who once commanded the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, said the facilities at Kadena offer enough space for the Futenma Marines to carry out their missions, so moving them away from the potential threats in the region would not be beneficial.
The report says that critical infrastructure and quality-of-life programs might not be available to units returning to domestic bases if defense officials keep up the current pace of the project, and urged the process be slowed until after full force and facilities assessments are finished later this year.
By Leo Shane III, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Wednesday, May 11, 2005
WASHINGTON — The future of the Pacific fighting force hinges on keeping Marines in Okinawa and abandoning proposals to move them to Guam, say members of the Overseas Basing Commission.
“Okinawa is the strategic linchpin in the Pacific region,” Commissioner James Thomson, CEO of the Rand Corp., said at a news conference Monday unveiling the group’s report on the future of overseas military facilities.
The report had leaked out on Friday, much of it reported in Sunday editions of Stars and Stripes.
“This is a matter ultimately of distance, how close one can be to the area of potential threat, either ones we already know about or ones that can emerge. The location of Okinawa from the point of covering those threats is much better than Guam. It’s closer.”
The commission has recommended that the Defense Department slow down the return of foreign-based troops to the United States, and specifically that most Marines currently on Okinawa remain there.
The report does recommend that the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station be relocated, either to Kadena Air Base or Marines Corps Air Station Iwakuni.
For the past two years, defense officials have discussed the possibility of relocating Marines off Okinawa, with rumors including moves to Guam, the Philippines or Hawaii.
Commissioner Anthony Less, a retired vice admiral who once commanded the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, said the facilities at Kadena offer enough space for the Futenma Marines to carry out their missions, so moving them away from the potential threats in the region would not be beneficial.
The report says that critical infrastructure and quality-of-life programs might not be available to units returning to domestic bases if defense officials keep up the current pace of the project, and urged the process be slowed until after full force and facilities assessments are finished later this year.
Monday, February 26, 2007
Military Power vs. People Power in Asia
FPIF Policy Report
People Power vs. Military Power in East Asia
John Feffer, IRC February 13, 2007
Editor: Chuck Hosking
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3990
Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
People power does not just trouble the sleep of dictators. It can also introduce an element of unpredictability and uncertainty into the security debate in pluralist societies. People, to put it bluntly, can be a problem for the military because civilians frequently come between a military and its objectives.
"In the short term, making governments more accountable to people introduces new uncertainties and limits into diplomacy," Kent Caldor has written about Northeast Asia. Calder's point was that transitional democracies are not ready to open national security to public debate. But the people power quandary perhaps even more profoundly affects Washington. Other nation's democracies sound good on paper and in principle but are risky business in practice. Having frequently forged comfortable military relationships with reliably authoritarian
administrations such as Park Chung Hee's in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek's in Taiwan, the United States has recently discovered that democratic movements in East Asia can pose an unpredictable and worrisome challenge to U.S. security objectives. Indeed, the transformation of U.S. doctrine and force posture in East Asia results not just from technological changes and the identification of new threats but also from the impact of democratic movements within the countries of our allies.
At the same time, people power influences decision-making in dictatorships. In North Korea, for instance, citizens do not communicate their views in any meaningful way through elections. Yet they are still actors in an important political sense. The leadership in Pyongyang relies on people power - not in the sense of an anti-government movement but as an expression of nationalist sentiment - to achieve some measure of legitimacy for its policies. In this sense, people power and democracy are not interchangeable concepts.
In short, people power is viewed neither wholly negatively by putatively totalitarian regimes nor wholly positively by putatively democratic regimes. The notion that democracy and military security mutually reinforce one another both underestimates the staying power of systems like North Korea and China where democracy is anemic and overestimates the strength of military alliances between more robustly democratic states. This misreading of the relationship between people power and military power significantly distorts the understanding of three major shifts in security doctrine in the United States, North Korea, and South Korea. Conventionally interpreted as responses to geopolitical realities
and technological advances, these transformations in thinking also strongly reflect the influence of the grassroots.
The failure to connect people power to these evolving shifts in doctrine has profound policy implications for the United States. By misjudging popular support for hard-line stances in authoritarian states and by glossing over grassroots challenges to U.S. security strategies in more democratic countries, Washington continues to risk clashing with its regional adversaries and, ultimately, losing influence with its regional allies.
Strategic Flexibility
According to conventional wisdom, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the development of the concept of "strategic flexibility" were chiefly responses to advances in technology (primarily computers and communications) and the application of market principles to military management. The end of the Cold War, the subsequent attacks of September 11, and an altered security environment further accelerated these shifts in doctrine and force structure. The latest war-fighting gurus view fixed military bases with lumbering tanks and static defenses as comparatively low-tech and incapable of addressing rapidly emerging
conflicts and threats. U.S. forces, they argue, should be flexible enough to respond to North Korean missiles, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, or a cross-straits confrontation in Taiwan.
But a case can be made that the RMA and strategic flexibility are also responses to NIMBY (not in my back yard) and democratic movements. Fixed bases were an easy target, not only for the enemy but also for popular discontent, starting in the Philippines and spreading to Okinawa, Tokyo, and Seoul (not to mention other parts of the world such as Vieques). The U.S. security umbrella was generally popular among allied leaders, but the actual U.S. security footprint was another matter.
In the Republic of Korea (ROK), popular anger against U.S. forces came to world attention in 2002, when tens of thousands of South Korean citizens demonstrated in the streets after the deaths of two schoolchildren run over by U.S. military armored vehicles. But this was not the first time that popular movements tried to effect change in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Earlier there were protests over the Status of Forces Agreement. Adding its voice, the "Reclaiming Our Land" movement targeted U.S. bases, as did organizing around prostitution. And the environmental movement campaigned against the toxic byproducts of the U.S. military presence. Nor has resistance dissipated with the planned reduction of
U.S. troops. South Korean movements continue to challenge U.S. plans to expand military facilities in Pyongtaek.
It is also important to acknowledge the influence that the inter-Korean summit of June 2000 had on the transformation of security perspectives. Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy, itself a response to and an incorporation of popular efforts at North-South reconciliation, changed the strategic nature of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The cross-border tourism projects, the efforts to reconnect the north-south train line, and the industrial park at Kaesong all challenged military planning and even the notion of an infantry tripwire. South Korea's more conciliatory policy toward North Korea, which began to diverge from Washington's hard line after 2001, has made Seoul a less reliable U.S. ally. For instance, reportedly apprehensive that Seoul would transfer advanced technology to Pyongyang, the United States cancelled the sale of four Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft to South Korea in July.
Roh Moo-Hyun's more participatory style of government has also had an effect on security issues beyond the reunification question. It actively brought representatives of people power movements-of civil society-into government and raised expectations that the new administration would be more responsive to concerns percolating up from below. Due in part to this responsiveness, South Korea only begrudgingly sent troops to Iraq, has refused to join either the missile defense alliance or the Proliferation Security Initiative, and has looked askance at the whole notion of strategic flexibility for fear that it might draw Seoul into a conflict with Beijing.
Democratic movements profoundly informed South Korea's new strategic posture. They also provoked both a long-term reappraisal of U.S. strategic objectives and, in 2003, a specific response by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to accelerate the process of U.S. troop reductions in South Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control to Seoul.
Washington's concept of strategic flexibility, in other words, is not only useful for fighting an unpredictable enemy but also for dealing with an unpredictable ally. With Manila, the United States negotiated a Visiting Forces Agreement that not only sidestepped many NIMBY issues but also accorded U.S. forces much greater potential access throughout the Philippines to carry out a rather vaguely defined range of activities. With Seoul, Washington is negotiating a deal to reduce its costs and its overall footprint (though not its firepower). It will also reduce U.S. dependency on South Korean support for strategic flexibility.
Strategic flexibility has allowed Washington to count less on a South Korea, perceived to be unreliable and to shift its security focus to Japan, a more dependable supporter of U.S. positions in the region and elsewhere. If Japan proves unreliable in the future, because of heightened NIMBYism or a nationalist backlash against the security partnership with the United States, strategic flexibility will allow Washington to negotiate a better deal with someone else. And indeed, with popular sentiment still running against U.S. bases in Okinawa and on the mainland, Washington has been forced to draw some forces back to
Guam. Meanwhile, activists in Guam have already begun to protest the relocation of half the U.S. Marines Corps contingent currently based in Okinawa.
South Korea, even under authoritarianism, was not always predictably subservient to U.S. military objectives. Park Chung-Hee was notoriously resistant to the troop reductions that President Carter proposed in the late 1970s. But in general, an authoritarian South Korea was more predictably anti-communist, pro-United States, favorably inclined toward Japan, and suspicious of China than a democratic South Korea. The same can be said about a quiescent Okinawa, an authoritarian Taiwan, and the Marcos-era Philippines. Close U.S. relations with yesteryear's East Asian dictators required a certain flexibility in stated principles. Today, close relations with their democratic successors require flexibility in strategic posture.
Military-First Doctrine
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is no fan of democratic movements. If the rumors of military coups are correct, he is even worried about popular uprisings within the North Korean military. Polls of North Koreans, if they existed, might strengthen Kim's hand by revealing a fierce determination to defend the homeland, a preference for an "iron fist" to insure domestic stability, and even a nationalist pride in their country's entry into the nuclear club. But popular discontent over budget priorities and disapproval of the leadership's decisions over the last decade-not to mention widespread human rights abuses-would likely
undermine his political position. There is no sign that the North Korean government plans to introduce even the modest political reforms adopted by its putative ally China. There is also no tradition of democracy in North Korea to which a dissident or opposition movement might appeal.
In the mid-1990s, Kim Jong Il introduced the "military first" doctrine to consolidate his own political position and mobilize the country against threats both external and internal. In 2003, the doctrine officially became an ideology. At one level, the leadership's emphasis on the military is a pragmatic political decision. Because of its sheer size, the military substitutes for any representative political body. There are practically no civilians in North Korea: there are only future soldiers, current soldiers, veterans, and families of soldiers. The military is the only truly functioning institution in the society, not only in terms of protecting borders and preparing for the much-touted foreign attack, but also in maintaining infrastructure and keeping the
extraction industries running.
By putting the military first, the North Korean leadership is responding to a perceived foreign threat from the outside and strengthening the regime's hold on power. But it is also appealing to the country's most representative institution. In this sense, the military-first doctrine is a populist platform. Pyongyang's October nuclear test can be interpreted-in addition to its deterrent and "bargaining chip" purposes-as an attempt to stimulate nationalist pride and provide some measure of compensation for the economic adversity of the past decade, revealing that popular sentiment is not irrelevant to North Korean policymaking. North Koreans make their voices heard not through the ballot box or demonstrations but rather through their membership in military institutions and their capacity to respond to nationalist appeals.
Such informal political participation should not be construed as either pro-government or anti-government. It is very difficult to know the true feelings of North Koreans. But it would be a mistake for outside governments to assume an unbridgeable gulf between the people and the state. A mass organization like the army and mass ideologies like nationalism mediate between the two. It's certainly not democracy. But even states that aspire to totalitarian control must factor people power into their political calculus beyond merely its potential threat to regime stability.
Strategic Redeployment?
When evaluating the political situation on the Korean Peninsula, particularly as it relates to security issues, it is routine to discuss the personal quirks of the leaders (Kim Jong Il, Roh Moo-Hyun, George Bush) or the characteristics of their coteries (the revolutionary generation in North Korea, the 386 generation of 40-something activists in South Korea, the neoconservative generation in the United States). Yet it may well be the clout of popular movements - or the threat of them - that will prove most influential in determining the future security environment on the peninsula.
Behind the headlines, popular mobilization has profoundly influenced three key doctrinal shifts: the military-first approach in North Korea, a more independent security policy in South Korea, and strategic flexibility in the United States. Leaders in both democratic and nondemocratic countries have kept watchful eyes on people power when formulating security policy, both in terms of mobilizing support (through nationalist or populist appeals) and avoiding negative responses (such as NIMBY).
The future of these doctrinal shifts remains unclear. Should the current tensions around the nuclear conflict subside, North Korea might conceivably switch its military-first doctrine to the competing concept of kangsong taeguk (strong and prosperous nation) and reallocate precious resources to economic modernization. If market reforms don't benefit a large enough portion of the population, however, the country will face a pre-revolutionary predicament of rising and unmet expectations. Only if the military is fully behind these changes, in the sense of implementing them as well as benefiting from them, will the regime avoid collapse. As in Cuba, however, Washington's policy of unmitigated pressure allows Pyongyang to retain a measure of popular support through relentless, nationalist invocations of an external threat.
In South Korea, the character of Roh Moo-Hyun's more independent foreign policy is often ascribed to a narrow party agenda rather than reflecting more significant changes in how South Koreans view their country's role in the region. China has become a much more important economic partner and diplomatic player in the region, and South Koreans are rapidly waking up to this reality (conflicts over the Koguryo historical dispute notwithstanding). U.S. force reductions in Korea, and what will inevitably be a widening conflict over military purchasing and interoperability, will only distance Seoul further from Washington. Even the conservatives, should they win the 2007 presidential election in South Korea, will likely continue Roh's more independent military and foreign policy, partly in response to the pressures of popular sentiment and partly because of geopolitical realities such as China's economic might.
The biggest question mark remains the future of Washington's policy of strategic flexibility. Technological change and new threat perceptions suggest that this doctrinal shift will be with us for some time. But as a response to democratic movements on the ground, strategic flexibility might prove self-defeating. Shifting security emphasis from one ally to another depending on the amplitude of protests around U.S. basing, military policies, or out-of-area operations may not prove sustainable. In the grand scheme, with the focus of U.S. geostrategy still on the Middle East and a period of military belt-tightening likely to return to Washington, strategic flexibility may simply become a cover for U.S. disengagement--strategic redeployment--not just from South Korea but from the region as a whole.
--------
John Feffer is the co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus and the director of global affairs at the International Relations Center.
People Power vs. Military Power in East Asia
John Feffer, IRC February 13, 2007
Editor: Chuck Hosking
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3990
Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
People power does not just trouble the sleep of dictators. It can also introduce an element of unpredictability and uncertainty into the security debate in pluralist societies. People, to put it bluntly, can be a problem for the military because civilians frequently come between a military and its objectives.
"In the short term, making governments more accountable to people introduces new uncertainties and limits into diplomacy," Kent Caldor has written about Northeast Asia. Calder's point was that transitional democracies are not ready to open national security to public debate. But the people power quandary perhaps even more profoundly affects Washington. Other nation's democracies sound good on paper and in principle but are risky business in practice. Having frequently forged comfortable military relationships with reliably authoritarian
administrations such as Park Chung Hee's in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek's in Taiwan, the United States has recently discovered that democratic movements in East Asia can pose an unpredictable and worrisome challenge to U.S. security objectives. Indeed, the transformation of U.S. doctrine and force posture in East Asia results not just from technological changes and the identification of new threats but also from the impact of democratic movements within the countries of our allies.
At the same time, people power influences decision-making in dictatorships. In North Korea, for instance, citizens do not communicate their views in any meaningful way through elections. Yet they are still actors in an important political sense. The leadership in Pyongyang relies on people power - not in the sense of an anti-government movement but as an expression of nationalist sentiment - to achieve some measure of legitimacy for its policies. In this sense, people power and democracy are not interchangeable concepts.
In short, people power is viewed neither wholly negatively by putatively totalitarian regimes nor wholly positively by putatively democratic regimes. The notion that democracy and military security mutually reinforce one another both underestimates the staying power of systems like North Korea and China where democracy is anemic and overestimates the strength of military alliances between more robustly democratic states. This misreading of the relationship between people power and military power significantly distorts the understanding of three major shifts in security doctrine in the United States, North Korea, and South Korea. Conventionally interpreted as responses to geopolitical realities
and technological advances, these transformations in thinking also strongly reflect the influence of the grassroots.
The failure to connect people power to these evolving shifts in doctrine has profound policy implications for the United States. By misjudging popular support for hard-line stances in authoritarian states and by glossing over grassroots challenges to U.S. security strategies in more democratic countries, Washington continues to risk clashing with its regional adversaries and, ultimately, losing influence with its regional allies.
Strategic Flexibility
According to conventional wisdom, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the development of the concept of "strategic flexibility" were chiefly responses to advances in technology (primarily computers and communications) and the application of market principles to military management. The end of the Cold War, the subsequent attacks of September 11, and an altered security environment further accelerated these shifts in doctrine and force structure. The latest war-fighting gurus view fixed military bases with lumbering tanks and static defenses as comparatively low-tech and incapable of addressing rapidly emerging
conflicts and threats. U.S. forces, they argue, should be flexible enough to respond to North Korean missiles, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, or a cross-straits confrontation in Taiwan.
But a case can be made that the RMA and strategic flexibility are also responses to NIMBY (not in my back yard) and democratic movements. Fixed bases were an easy target, not only for the enemy but also for popular discontent, starting in the Philippines and spreading to Okinawa, Tokyo, and Seoul (not to mention other parts of the world such as Vieques). The U.S. security umbrella was generally popular among allied leaders, but the actual U.S. security footprint was another matter.
In the Republic of Korea (ROK), popular anger against U.S. forces came to world attention in 2002, when tens of thousands of South Korean citizens demonstrated in the streets after the deaths of two schoolchildren run over by U.S. military armored vehicles. But this was not the first time that popular movements tried to effect change in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Earlier there were protests over the Status of Forces Agreement. Adding its voice, the "Reclaiming Our Land" movement targeted U.S. bases, as did organizing around prostitution. And the environmental movement campaigned against the toxic byproducts of the U.S. military presence. Nor has resistance dissipated with the planned reduction of
U.S. troops. South Korean movements continue to challenge U.S. plans to expand military facilities in Pyongtaek.
It is also important to acknowledge the influence that the inter-Korean summit of June 2000 had on the transformation of security perspectives. Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy, itself a response to and an incorporation of popular efforts at North-South reconciliation, changed the strategic nature of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The cross-border tourism projects, the efforts to reconnect the north-south train line, and the industrial park at Kaesong all challenged military planning and even the notion of an infantry tripwire. South Korea's more conciliatory policy toward North Korea, which began to diverge from Washington's hard line after 2001, has made Seoul a less reliable U.S. ally. For instance, reportedly apprehensive that Seoul would transfer advanced technology to Pyongyang, the United States cancelled the sale of four Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft to South Korea in July.
Roh Moo-Hyun's more participatory style of government has also had an effect on security issues beyond the reunification question. It actively brought representatives of people power movements-of civil society-into government and raised expectations that the new administration would be more responsive to concerns percolating up from below. Due in part to this responsiveness, South Korea only begrudgingly sent troops to Iraq, has refused to join either the missile defense alliance or the Proliferation Security Initiative, and has looked askance at the whole notion of strategic flexibility for fear that it might draw Seoul into a conflict with Beijing.
Democratic movements profoundly informed South Korea's new strategic posture. They also provoked both a long-term reappraisal of U.S. strategic objectives and, in 2003, a specific response by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to accelerate the process of U.S. troop reductions in South Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control to Seoul.
Washington's concept of strategic flexibility, in other words, is not only useful for fighting an unpredictable enemy but also for dealing with an unpredictable ally. With Manila, the United States negotiated a Visiting Forces Agreement that not only sidestepped many NIMBY issues but also accorded U.S. forces much greater potential access throughout the Philippines to carry out a rather vaguely defined range of activities. With Seoul, Washington is negotiating a deal to reduce its costs and its overall footprint (though not its firepower). It will also reduce U.S. dependency on South Korean support for strategic flexibility.
Strategic flexibility has allowed Washington to count less on a South Korea, perceived to be unreliable and to shift its security focus to Japan, a more dependable supporter of U.S. positions in the region and elsewhere. If Japan proves unreliable in the future, because of heightened NIMBYism or a nationalist backlash against the security partnership with the United States, strategic flexibility will allow Washington to negotiate a better deal with someone else. And indeed, with popular sentiment still running against U.S. bases in Okinawa and on the mainland, Washington has been forced to draw some forces back to
Guam. Meanwhile, activists in Guam have already begun to protest the relocation of half the U.S. Marines Corps contingent currently based in Okinawa.
South Korea, even under authoritarianism, was not always predictably subservient to U.S. military objectives. Park Chung-Hee was notoriously resistant to the troop reductions that President Carter proposed in the late 1970s. But in general, an authoritarian South Korea was more predictably anti-communist, pro-United States, favorably inclined toward Japan, and suspicious of China than a democratic South Korea. The same can be said about a quiescent Okinawa, an authoritarian Taiwan, and the Marcos-era Philippines. Close U.S. relations with yesteryear's East Asian dictators required a certain flexibility in stated principles. Today, close relations with their democratic successors require flexibility in strategic posture.
Military-First Doctrine
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is no fan of democratic movements. If the rumors of military coups are correct, he is even worried about popular uprisings within the North Korean military. Polls of North Koreans, if they existed, might strengthen Kim's hand by revealing a fierce determination to defend the homeland, a preference for an "iron fist" to insure domestic stability, and even a nationalist pride in their country's entry into the nuclear club. But popular discontent over budget priorities and disapproval of the leadership's decisions over the last decade-not to mention widespread human rights abuses-would likely
undermine his political position. There is no sign that the North Korean government plans to introduce even the modest political reforms adopted by its putative ally China. There is also no tradition of democracy in North Korea to which a dissident or opposition movement might appeal.
In the mid-1990s, Kim Jong Il introduced the "military first" doctrine to consolidate his own political position and mobilize the country against threats both external and internal. In 2003, the doctrine officially became an ideology. At one level, the leadership's emphasis on the military is a pragmatic political decision. Because of its sheer size, the military substitutes for any representative political body. There are practically no civilians in North Korea: there are only future soldiers, current soldiers, veterans, and families of soldiers. The military is the only truly functioning institution in the society, not only in terms of protecting borders and preparing for the much-touted foreign attack, but also in maintaining infrastructure and keeping the
extraction industries running.
By putting the military first, the North Korean leadership is responding to a perceived foreign threat from the outside and strengthening the regime's hold on power. But it is also appealing to the country's most representative institution. In this sense, the military-first doctrine is a populist platform. Pyongyang's October nuclear test can be interpreted-in addition to its deterrent and "bargaining chip" purposes-as an attempt to stimulate nationalist pride and provide some measure of compensation for the economic adversity of the past decade, revealing that popular sentiment is not irrelevant to North Korean policymaking. North Koreans make their voices heard not through the ballot box or demonstrations but rather through their membership in military institutions and their capacity to respond to nationalist appeals.
Such informal political participation should not be construed as either pro-government or anti-government. It is very difficult to know the true feelings of North Koreans. But it would be a mistake for outside governments to assume an unbridgeable gulf between the people and the state. A mass organization like the army and mass ideologies like nationalism mediate between the two. It's certainly not democracy. But even states that aspire to totalitarian control must factor people power into their political calculus beyond merely its potential threat to regime stability.
Strategic Redeployment?
When evaluating the political situation on the Korean Peninsula, particularly as it relates to security issues, it is routine to discuss the personal quirks of the leaders (Kim Jong Il, Roh Moo-Hyun, George Bush) or the characteristics of their coteries (the revolutionary generation in North Korea, the 386 generation of 40-something activists in South Korea, the neoconservative generation in the United States). Yet it may well be the clout of popular movements - or the threat of them - that will prove most influential in determining the future security environment on the peninsula.
Behind the headlines, popular mobilization has profoundly influenced three key doctrinal shifts: the military-first approach in North Korea, a more independent security policy in South Korea, and strategic flexibility in the United States. Leaders in both democratic and nondemocratic countries have kept watchful eyes on people power when formulating security policy, both in terms of mobilizing support (through nationalist or populist appeals) and avoiding negative responses (such as NIMBY).
The future of these doctrinal shifts remains unclear. Should the current tensions around the nuclear conflict subside, North Korea might conceivably switch its military-first doctrine to the competing concept of kangsong taeguk (strong and prosperous nation) and reallocate precious resources to economic modernization. If market reforms don't benefit a large enough portion of the population, however, the country will face a pre-revolutionary predicament of rising and unmet expectations. Only if the military is fully behind these changes, in the sense of implementing them as well as benefiting from them, will the regime avoid collapse. As in Cuba, however, Washington's policy of unmitigated pressure allows Pyongyang to retain a measure of popular support through relentless, nationalist invocations of an external threat.
In South Korea, the character of Roh Moo-Hyun's more independent foreign policy is often ascribed to a narrow party agenda rather than reflecting more significant changes in how South Koreans view their country's role in the region. China has become a much more important economic partner and diplomatic player in the region, and South Koreans are rapidly waking up to this reality (conflicts over the Koguryo historical dispute notwithstanding). U.S. force reductions in Korea, and what will inevitably be a widening conflict over military purchasing and interoperability, will only distance Seoul further from Washington. Even the conservatives, should they win the 2007 presidential election in South Korea, will likely continue Roh's more independent military and foreign policy, partly in response to the pressures of popular sentiment and partly because of geopolitical realities such as China's economic might.
The biggest question mark remains the future of Washington's policy of strategic flexibility. Technological change and new threat perceptions suggest that this doctrinal shift will be with us for some time. But as a response to democratic movements on the ground, strategic flexibility might prove self-defeating. Shifting security emphasis from one ally to another depending on the amplitude of protests around U.S. basing, military policies, or out-of-area operations may not prove sustainable. In the grand scheme, with the focus of U.S. geostrategy still on the Middle East and a period of military belt-tightening likely to return to Washington, strategic flexibility may simply become a cover for U.S. disengagement--strategic redeployment--not just from South Korea but from the region as a whole.
--------
John Feffer is the co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus and the director of global affairs at the International Relations Center.
Saturday, March 11, 2006
Guam Seen as Pivotal US Base
Guam seen as pivotal U.S. base
Originally published 11:07 p.m., March 10, 2006
Richard Halloran
The Washington Times
ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, Guam -- The U.S. Pacific Command is moving forward with plans to recast the posture of its military forces in the western Pacific and Asia with the new pivot point to be a robust base on the island of Guam.
"Look at a map," said the command's leader, Adm. William J. Fallon, as he flew toward Guam after a weeklong trek through Southeast Asia. He pointed to the relatively short distances from Guam to South Korea; the Taiwan Strait, across which China and Taiwan confront each other; and Southeast Asia, the frontier of terror in Asia.
U.S. officers often talk about the "tyranny of distance" in the Pacific Command's area of operations, which runs from the west coast of North America to the east coast of Africa. Guam, when it is fully operational, will provide a base for land, naval and air forces closer to targets than for forces on the U.S. mainland or Hawaii. Guam was a major air base during the war in Vietnam.
A genuine advantage, Adm. Fallon said, is that "Guam is American territory." The island does not have the political restrictions, such as those in South Korea, that could impede U.S. military moves in an emergency. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, who repeatedly has taken an anti-American stance, has suggested that U.S. forces could not be deployed from his nation without his government's approval.
In an interview on his airplane and in congressional testimony this week, the admiral emphasized the vital role that Japan would continue to play in U.S. strategy.
"The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the most important pact in the Pacific," he said. Even so, depending on what sort of government is in power in Tokyo, political complications could arise in deploying forces elsewhere from Japan.
The disadvantage of Guam is the run-down state of the island's infrastructure. The roads, the electrical system, the water supply, piers and airfield runways are in disrepair.
"I want that infrastructure fixed," Adm. Fallon said. One runway at Andersen Air Force Base already has been demolished for rebuilding. Guam also is vulnerable to typhoons and should have its power lines buried, Adm. Fallon said.
Adm. Fallon said he saw the island as primarily a staging area through which troops, ships and planes would surge toward contingencies in Asia. The island's maintenance and repair capacity would be refurbished and expanded so that, for instance, aircraft carriers could be serviced without having to return to home ports on the West Coast.
What this will cost and whether Congress will provide sufficient funds has not been determined.
About 7,000 Marines, including the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, would go to Guam from the Japanese island of Okinawa, where friction between Marines and Okinawans has been constant. Three fast-attack submarines are based at Guam, and two more will be assigned there. Squadrons of B-1 bombers are rotated through Guam from the United States for several months at a time.
On realigning U.S. forces in Japan, American and Japanese officials have been putting the finishing touches on an agreement to be completed by the end of this month. It is to include a new U.S. Army headquarters alongside a Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force headquarters at Camp Zama, southwest of Tokyo, and a similar arrangement for air force units at Yokota Air Base, west of Tokyo.
Japan has agreed that the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington will replace the Kitty Hawk, driven by conventional steam turbines, in Yokosuka when it is retired in 2008.
Throughout the discussion of his vision for positioning forces in the Asia-Pacific region, Adm. Fallon emphasized "flexibility."
"We need to have forces ready to react," he said. "We must have built-in flexibility" to meet emergencies, including disaster relief and other humanitarian operations.
He underscored that he flew by helicopter from Clark Field north of Manila in the Philippines to the amphibious assault ship Essex at sea to thank the Marines and sailors aboard for their efforts in trying to rescue victims of the giant mudslide on the island of Leyte.
"You responded magnificently with great speed, agility, demonstrating flexibility in shifting your priority focus," he told those assembled on the flight deck. They had started an exercise in the Philippines before taking on the relief work.
In congressional testimony, Adm. Fallon expanded on that theme: "Forward deployed forces, ready for immediate employment, send an unambiguous signal of undiminished U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific area. Agile and responsive global forces also act to deter aggression."
Originally published 11:07 p.m., March 10, 2006
Richard Halloran
The Washington Times
ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, Guam -- The U.S. Pacific Command is moving forward with plans to recast the posture of its military forces in the western Pacific and Asia with the new pivot point to be a robust base on the island of Guam.
"Look at a map," said the command's leader, Adm. William J. Fallon, as he flew toward Guam after a weeklong trek through Southeast Asia. He pointed to the relatively short distances from Guam to South Korea; the Taiwan Strait, across which China and Taiwan confront each other; and Southeast Asia, the frontier of terror in Asia.
U.S. officers often talk about the "tyranny of distance" in the Pacific Command's area of operations, which runs from the west coast of North America to the east coast of Africa. Guam, when it is fully operational, will provide a base for land, naval and air forces closer to targets than for forces on the U.S. mainland or Hawaii. Guam was a major air base during the war in Vietnam.
A genuine advantage, Adm. Fallon said, is that "Guam is American territory." The island does not have the political restrictions, such as those in South Korea, that could impede U.S. military moves in an emergency. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, who repeatedly has taken an anti-American stance, has suggested that U.S. forces could not be deployed from his nation without his government's approval.
In an interview on his airplane and in congressional testimony this week, the admiral emphasized the vital role that Japan would continue to play in U.S. strategy.
"The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the most important pact in the Pacific," he said. Even so, depending on what sort of government is in power in Tokyo, political complications could arise in deploying forces elsewhere from Japan.
The disadvantage of Guam is the run-down state of the island's infrastructure. The roads, the electrical system, the water supply, piers and airfield runways are in disrepair.
"I want that infrastructure fixed," Adm. Fallon said. One runway at Andersen Air Force Base already has been demolished for rebuilding. Guam also is vulnerable to typhoons and should have its power lines buried, Adm. Fallon said.
Adm. Fallon said he saw the island as primarily a staging area through which troops, ships and planes would surge toward contingencies in Asia. The island's maintenance and repair capacity would be refurbished and expanded so that, for instance, aircraft carriers could be serviced without having to return to home ports on the West Coast.
What this will cost and whether Congress will provide sufficient funds has not been determined.
About 7,000 Marines, including the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, would go to Guam from the Japanese island of Okinawa, where friction between Marines and Okinawans has been constant. Three fast-attack submarines are based at Guam, and two more will be assigned there. Squadrons of B-1 bombers are rotated through Guam from the United States for several months at a time.
On realigning U.S. forces in Japan, American and Japanese officials have been putting the finishing touches on an agreement to be completed by the end of this month. It is to include a new U.S. Army headquarters alongside a Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force headquarters at Camp Zama, southwest of Tokyo, and a similar arrangement for air force units at Yokota Air Base, west of Tokyo.
Japan has agreed that the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington will replace the Kitty Hawk, driven by conventional steam turbines, in Yokosuka when it is retired in 2008.
Throughout the discussion of his vision for positioning forces in the Asia-Pacific region, Adm. Fallon emphasized "flexibility."
"We need to have forces ready to react," he said. "We must have built-in flexibility" to meet emergencies, including disaster relief and other humanitarian operations.
He underscored that he flew by helicopter from Clark Field north of Manila in the Philippines to the amphibious assault ship Essex at sea to thank the Marines and sailors aboard for their efforts in trying to rescue victims of the giant mudslide on the island of Leyte.
"You responded magnificently with great speed, agility, demonstrating flexibility in shifting your priority focus," he told those assembled on the flight deck. They had started an exercise in the Philippines before taking on the relief work.
In congressional testimony, Adm. Fallon expanded on that theme: "Forward deployed forces, ready for immediate employment, send an unambiguous signal of undiminished U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific area. Agile and responsive global forces also act to deter aggression."
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