I’ve been a bit critical of International Security in the past, so I want now to highlight a good article in its summer issue by Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, worth reading.
Their key conclusion:
It is just as important, though, to be clear on what is not needed: the analysis above implies that AirSea Battle is not required for U.S. security in the Western Pacific, nor must the United States accept the costs and risks associated with its requirement for massive preemptive attack against Chinese land-based missiles and infrastructure located deep in mainland China. Our analysis implies no need to redesign or fundamentally restructure the U.S. Navy and Air Force to cope with Chinese A2/AD. A number of more limited changes are needed, but the analysis above does not imply a case for transformational change to meet the threat of A2/AD in the Western Pacific — incremental updating on the margins of existing U.S. capabilities and programs is sufficient.